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Abstract— We investigate the existence of secure bit com-
mitment protocols in the convex framework for probabilistic
theories. The framework makes only minimal assumptions, and
can be used to formalize quantum theory, classical probability
theory, and a host of other possibilities. We prove that in all
such theories that are locally non-classical but do not have
entanglement, there exists a bit commitment protocol that is
exponentially secure in the number of systems used.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1984 paper [1] in which they introduced information-
theoretically secure quantum key distribution, Bennett and
Brassard also considered the possibility of information-
theoretically secure bit commitment. Bit commitment is a basic
primitive in classical cryptography, to which many practically
important cryptographic tasks, such as secure function evalua-
tion, can be reduced. In a bit commitment protocol, one party,
usually called Alice, performs some act that is supposed to
irrefutably convince another party, Bob, that she has irrevoca-
bly committed to a value, 0 or 1, of a bit, without leaking any
information about the value of the bit to Bob. Later she can
perform another act that reveals the value of the bit to Bob
and enables him to perform some test that may be necessary
for him to verify that she was indeed committed. Classically,
bit commitment can be achieved with computational security,
but not with information-theoretic security.
Bennett and Brassard showed that the bit commitment
scheme they considered could be defeated by the use of
entangled states. Attempts were made [2] to construct secure
bit commitment protocols, but Lo and Chau [3], and indepen-
dently Mayers [4], showed that an entangled attack akin to
Bennett and Brassard’s defeats all quantum bit commitment
protocols, and there is now a solid consensus that this does
indeed cover all reasonable schemes and attacks [5].
Soon after this development, Brassard [6] and Fuchs [7]
asked whether the impossibility of bit commitment might be
a manifestation of a deep information-theoretic property of
quantum mechanics, fit for a crucial role in an information-
theoretic characterization, or reconstruction, of the formalism
of quantum theory. Such a reconstruction, at its most am-
bitious, is envisioned as similar to Einstein’s reconstruction
of the dynamics and kinetics of macroscopic bodies on the
basis of simple principles with clear operational meanings
and experimental consequences. As argued in (for example)
[8], [9], [7], such a reconstruction could lend force to the
view that the foundations of quantum mechanics are properly
couched in terms of information, a view which has received
increasing attention with the rise of quantum information
science. Short of this ambitious goal, there are still strong
reasons to pursue an informational characterization of quantum
mechanics. It should lead to a principled understanding of the
features of quantum mechanics that account for its better-than-
classical information processing power. Such an understanding
could help guide the search for new algorithms and protocols,
both positively, by providing conceptual tools to exploit in a
variety of settings, and negatively by identifying information-
processing tasks requiring properties that quantum mechanics
lacks.
Brassard and Fuchs’ conjecture was that the impossibility of
bit commitment might, in conjunction with the possibility of
secure secret key distribution and the impossibility of instan-
taneous signaling between distinct physical systems, suffice
to characterize quantum theory. Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson
proved a result (the CBH theorem) [8], close to this conjecture
in the framework of C∗-algebraic theories. They demonstrated
the existence of a protocol related to the no-bit commitment
theorem, but weaker, between two “local” algebras, whenever
the local algebras are not commutative (not classical) and
there are entangled states between the algebras. However,
in finite dimensions, C∗-algebraic theories are essentially
quantum mechanics with superselection rules, so in our view,
a much broader framework is desirable. Further evidence
for this view is Halvorson’s demonstration [10] that no-bit-
commitment follows from no-signaling and no-cloning within
the C∗-algebraic framework. To obtain the most illuminating
characterization of quantum mechanics in terms of information
processing, one should work in a framework wide enough to
include not only quantum and classical mechanics, but also a
wide variety of other theories that can serve as foils to them;
the C∗-algebraic framework is too restrictive.
It is therefore an open question whether non-classical the-
ories without entanglement are ruled out by demanding the
impossibility of secure bit commitment, in some appropriately
broad framework. In this paper, we answer that question in the
affirmative. We work in a framework that allows for a wide
range of probabilistic theories, including not only quantum
and classical theories, but also theories of Popescu-Rohrlich,
or nonlocal, boxes [11], [12] that allow nonlocality stronger
than that in quantum mechanics, as well as many other types of
theory. For any nonclassical theory within the framework that
does not permit entanglement between systems, we construct
a bit-commitment protocol that is exponentially secure in the
number of systems used.
We proceed as follows. First the framework of generalized
probabilistic theories is introduced and our bit-commitment
protocol is defined. We then prove that such a protocol
always exists in a non-classical theory. Next, we prove it
to be exponentially secure in all theories that don’t allow
entanglement. Finally we give a summary and discussion.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
The framework is that of convex operational or gener-
alized probabilistic theories, for which no-cloning and no-
broadcasting theorems were proved in [13], [14], to which
we refer for further background. The set of normalized states
of a system is a compact convex set Ω ⊆ Rd. Embed Ω
in Rd+1, avoiding the origin, and let Cone(Ω) be the set
of linear combinations of elements of Ω with nonnegative
coefficients—the convex cone of unnormalized states. Its dual
cone, Cone(Ω)∗, consists of those linear functionals from
R
d+1 to R that are nonnegative on Cone(Ω). Measurement
outcomes are represented as effects: functionals e ∈ Cone(Ω)∗
satisfying e(ω) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. e(ω) is the probability
of outcome e for a system prepared in state ω. Equivalently,
effects are elements of the interval [0, u] in the dual cone,
whose endpoints are the zero functional and the unit functional
u that gives 1 on all normalized states. Measurements are sets
{ei} of effects with
∑
i ei = u (i.e. ∀ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i ei(ω) = 1).
For two state spaces, ΩA and ΩB , a spectrum of possible
“tensor products” is identified—these are candidates for de-
scribing a composite system built from subsystems with state
spaces ΩA and ΩB . In this work we need only one:
Definition: The minimal tensor product ΩA ⊗ ΩB is the
convex hull of the set of product states (ωA, ωB) ∈ ΩA×ΩB .
This generalizes the quantum-mechanical construction of
the unentangled or separable density matrices. The general
framework requires only that a tensor product be convex,
contain the minimal tensor product, and be contained in what’s
known as the maximal tensor product, of less interest here.
To describe quantum theory in this framework, Ω is chosen
to be isomorphic to the set of density operators on a Hilbert
space and Cone(Ω) is the set of positive operators. The
quantum tensor product lies strictly between the minimal and
maximal tensor products. In classical theory, Ω is a simplex of
probability distributions, i.e. the convex hull of d+ 1 linearly
independent points in Rd+1, and the maximal and minimal
tensor products coincide so there is no choice. Classical
theories are, equivalently, characterized by the property that
any state in Ω has a unique convex decomposition into pure
(extremal) elements.
It is important to specify the dynamics of theories in this
framework, because this specifies what Alice and Bob can
do to their systems. In this framework, dynamics are positive
linear maps L : Rd+1 → Rd+1, i.e. ones that take Cone(Ω)
to itself. Thus they take (not-necessarily-normalized) states
to states. Further, they must be norm-nonincreasing: for all
states ω ∈ Cone(Ω), u(L(ω)) ≤ u(ω); we use the term
operation, standard for the quantum case, to denote these.
The map eL : ω 7→ u(L(ω)) is an element of [0, u], and
is interpreted as an effect (measurement outcome) associated
with the dynamics L. Thus for normalized ω and positive L,
eL(ω) is interpreted as the probability with which the state
undergoes L. When eL = u, the map is norm-preserving; it
is an unconditional dynamics not associated with obtaining a
particular measurement outcome.
Early work on cryptography using stronger-than-quantum
nonlocal correlations, including [15] and [16] where entangled
correlations enabled bit commitment, did not situate these
correlations in a unified framework describing dynamics, mea-
surement, and state preparation such as the one we use here.
The assumptions embodied in this framework [14] are fairly
minimal. Two are substantive: first, the “local observability”
assumption effectively states that there are no “intrinsically
nonlocal” degrees of freedom that cannot be determined by
making repeated local measurements on the subsystems of
identically prepared systems. Second, a “no-signaling” con-
straint, which it is reasonable to take as the definition of what
we mean by an independent subsystem.
Our protocol uses the fact that any nonclassical state-
space contains states that have more than one distinct convex
decomposition into pure states. Alice encodes which bit she
has committed to as a choice of one out of two such de-
compositions. The security analysis we give requires that the
two sets of pure states used in the decompositions be disjoint,
and that all the states be exposed, but this can be achieved in
any nonclassical state space. A state is exposed if there is a
measurement outcome whose probability is 1 in that state, and
strictly less than 1 on any other state—an outcome that can be
guaranteed by that state, and only by that state. We call such
an effect the distinguishing effect for the state in question. It
is immediate from the definitions that exposed states are pure.
We write cl(S), conv(S), and Exp(S) for the topological
closure, convex hull, and set of exposed points of a set S.
III. THE PROTOCOL
Let a system have a non-simplicial, convex, compact state
space Ω of dimension d. The protocol uses a state µ that has
two distinct convex decompositions {(p0i , µ0i )}, {(p1j , µ1j)} into
finite disjoint sets of exposed states, that is,
µ =
N0∑
i=1
p0iµ
0
i =
N1∑
j=1
p1jµ
1
j . (1)
In the honest protocol, Alice first decides on a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
to commit to. She then draws n independent samples from the
probability distribution (pb1, pb2, . . . , pbNb), obtaining a string
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). She sends the state µbx = µbx1 ⊗ µ
b
x2 ⊗
. . .⊗ µbxn to Bob.
In the reveal phase, she sends b and x to Bob. Bob then
measures each subsystem of the state Alice sent in the commit
phase. On the k-th subsystem, he performs a measurement
containing the distinguishing effect for µbxk and aborts if the
result is not the distinguishing effect. If he obtains the appro-
priate distinguishing effect for every subsystem, he accepts.
Example of protocol: If Ω is the state space of a qubit, we
can transpose the one-qubit protocol of [1] to our setting. Ω
can be visualised as the Bloch sphere in R3 with pure states
on the surface and their mixtures inside the sphere. Let µ be
the center of the sphere, i.e. the completely mixed state 1
2
I =
1
2
|+〉〈+| + 1
2
|−〉〈−| = 1
2
|0〉〈0| + 1
2
|1〉〈1|, where |0〉, |1〉 is a
basis and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Let µ01 = |0〉〈0|, µ02 = |1〉〈1|,
µ11 = |+〉〈+|, µ
1
2 = |−〉〈−| and pbi = 12 ∀i, b. In the n = 1
case, if Alice decides to commit to b = 0 for example, she
would send Bob either |0〉 or |1〉, each with probability 1
2
. Say
she sends |0〉. To reveal she tells him “b = 0” and that she
sent |0〉. Bob would then measure in the |0〉, |1〉 basis, find |0〉
and accept. In [1], Bennett and Brassard considered this n = 1
protocol and showed it was completely nonbinding through an
entangled attack.
IV. EXISTENCE OF THE PROTOCOL
The existence of the protocol just described in any non-
classical theory follows from:
Theorem 1: Every nonsimplicial convex compact set Ω
of dimension d contains a state µ with two convex decom-
positions into disjoint sets of exposed states, whose total
cardinality is less than d+ 2.
The theorem follows from two lemmas.
Lemma 1: Let Ω be a non-simplicial compact convex set
of dimension d. Then the convex hull of any d+2 pure states
in Ω contains a state µ which has two convex decompositions,
µ =
N0∑
i=1
p0iµ
0
i =
N1∑
j=1
p1jµ
1
j , (2)
into disjoint sets of pure states, with N0 +N1 ≤ d+ 2.
Proof: Let Γ := {µ1, ..., µd+2} be an arbitrary set of d+ 2
pure states. Then conv(Γ) is non-simplicial because Ω has
dimension d. Choose a state ω with two different convex
decompositions {(p0i , µ0i ), i = 1, .., N0} and {(p1j , µ1j), j ∈
1, ..., N1} into elements of Γ so that N0+N1 is minimal. The
sets {µ01, . . . , µ
0
N0} and {µ11, . . . , µ1N1} are then disjoint. For if
they had a state in common, say (reindexing if necessary) µ01 =
µ11, then the (unnormalized) state ω′ := ω−minb(pb1)µb1 would
also have two different convex decompositions, contradicting
minimality. 
To show there are d + 2 exposed states we’ll use the
following special case of Theorem 18.7 of [17].
Theorem 2: A compact convex set Ω ⊆ Rd is the
closure of the convex hull of its exposed points, i.e. Ω =
cl(conv(Exp(Ω))).
Lemma 2: A nonsimplicial convex compact set Ω of dimen-
sion d has at least d+ 2 exposed points.
Proof: By Theorem 2, the closure of the convex hull of
Exp(C) is equal to C, and therefore cl(Cone(Exp(C))) =
Cone(C). Taking the closure of a convex subset (compact or
not) of Rn can’t increase the dimension of the subspace it
spans, so the linear span of Exp(C) must be Rd+1, and we
may pick a linearly independent subset of Exp(C), consisting
of d+ 1 exposed points. There must be an exposed point not
in the convex hull of these d+ 1 points, for if not the convex
hull of the exposed extreme points of C would be a simplex,
whence, using Theorem 2 and the fact that a finite-dimensional
simplex is closed, C itself would be a simplex. 
Since exposed states are pure, Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately
imply Theorem 1.
V. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
We adapt our security definition from Ref. [18], simplifying
to the setting where there is no communication from Bob to
Alice. We start with the formal definition:
Definition: Let ε ≥ 0. We say that a bit commitment
protocol with one-way communication is ε-secure if it has
the following properties:
• (ε-soundness) Assume that both parties are honest. Then
the probability that Bob aborts is at most ε and, if he
does not abort, then after the reveal phase he learns the
bit b that Alice committed to.
• (ε-hiding) Assume that Alice is honest. Then for all cheat-
ing strategies of Bob aiming to guess the committment
before the reveal phase. q0 + q1 ≤ 1 + ǫ, where qb is the
probability that Bob guesses correctly given that Alice
committed b.
• (ε-binding) Assume that Bob is honest. Then for all
commitments of Alice, p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε, where pb is
the maximum probability that Alice successfully reveals
b.
If any of the above hold for ε = 0, we say that the protocol
satisfies that property perfectly.
Our protocol is perfectly sound because if Alice is honest,
the distinguishing measurements that Bob makes based on
Alice’s claim give the correct answers with probability 1. In
general, one would consider the probability of either honest
participant accusing the other of cheating, but in a one-way
protocol, there is no provision for Alice to abort.
The protocol is also perfectly hiding—there is no way for
Bob to obtain information about the bit b during the post-
commit, pre-revelation phase, as the state µ⊗n that (honest)
Alice sent is independent of b.
The nontrivial part of the security analysis is to show that
the protocol is ε-binding—to show that Alice can’t cheat by
choosing which bit to reveal after she is supposed to be
committed to one or the other. In an ideal bit commitment
protocol, Alice could use randomness to commit to 0 with
probability p0 and 1 with probabilities p1 = 1−p0, so she can
achieve any pair p0, p1 in the definition such that p0+p1 = 1.
Our protocol only allows her to do a little better. For example,
if she wants to be able to reveal 0 with probability 1, then the
probability that she can reveal 1 is at most ε. Although it is
suitable for present purposes, we note that our definition of
ε-binding is too weak to establish composable security [19].
We’ll need a lemma about measurements.
Lemma 3: Suppose two exposed states µ 6= ν have distin-
guishing effects a and b. Let
f(µ, ν) := sup
ω∈Ω
(a(ω) + b(ω)) . (3)
Then 1 ≤ f(µ, ν) < 2.
Proof: For the upper bound, the function a+b is linear and
the set Ω is convex and compact, so the supremum of a + b
is achieved on a pure state ω′. Suppose a(ω′) + b(ω′) = 2.
Then we must have a(ω′) = 1 and b(ω′) = 1, which implies
ω′ = µ = ν, a contradiction. The lower bound follows from
considering ω = µ. 
Now define δ := min1≤i≤N0,1≤j≤N1
(
2− f(µ0i , µ
1
j)
)
,
where µ0i , µ1j run over the states used in the protocol. Note that
δ < 1, since at least one pair of states µ01, µ1j is not perfectly
distinguishable. This quantity δ will control the number n of
systems we need to use to achieve ε-security.
The proof also uses the following description of an optimal
set of strategies for a cheating Alice.
Lemma 4: An optimal strategy for Alice is as follows: she
tosses some coins and generates randomness λ with probability
weight p(λ). She then prepares an arbitrary string of pure
states ωλ1 ⊗ ω
λ
2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ω
λ
n. She sends them to Bob. In the
reveal phase, she can send an arbitrary bit b and an arbitrary
“claim sequence” xλ,b, that depends on the bit she wants to
claim and the randomness.
The state claim xλ,b, which is classical information, is
encoded in perfectly distinguishable states of some systems
Γ in the theory; it is easily shown that doing otherwise can’t
help Alice.
Proof of Lemma 4: A general cheating strategy for Alice
is to prepare an arbitrary state in Υ ⊗ Γ⊗n ⊗ Ω⊗n (where Υ
is some state space in the theory), and then do a b-dependent
positive map Lb on Υ⊗Γ⊗n just before sending Γ⊗n to Bob,
in an attempt to reveal b. Letting rl be probabilities, τ l ∈ Υ,
γlk ∈ Γ, ω
l
k ∈ Ω, the state before revelation is:∑
l
rlτ l ⊗ γl1 ⊗ · · · γ
l
n ⊗ ω
l
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ω
l
n . (4)
After Alice attempts to reveal b it is:
ψb :=
∑
l
rlLb(τ l ⊗ γ11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ γ
l
n)⊗ ω
l
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ω
l
n . (5)
Let φlb ≡
∑
m t
lmbγlmb1 ⊗· · ·⊗γ
lmb
n be the marginal state on
Γ⊗n induced by the state Lb(τ l ⊗ γl1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ γln). Then the
state of Γ⊗n ⊗ Ω⊗n is
χb :=
∑
l
rl
∑
m
tlmbγlmb1 ⊗ · · ·⊗ γ
lmb
n ⊗ω
l
1⊗ · · ·⊗ω
l
n . (6)
Bob will subject each copy of Γ to a standard measurement to
read Alice’s claim; the k-th system will yield a value x with
probability plmk (x) determined by γlmk . Alice could achieve
the same result by sampling the distribution of measurement
results plmk Bob would obtain from γlmk , perhaps keeping a
record q of the result of sampling, and sending a definite string
xlmqb1 ⊗ · · ·x
lmqb
n for the claim, encoded as distinguishable
states that will definitely give this string of outcomes. Letting
λ stand for lmq, we see that an optimal strategy for Alice is
as described in the Lemma. 
Theorem 3: Our bit commitment protocol is ε-binding with
ε = (1− δ)n.
Proof: Let abi be the distinguishing effect for µbi (b ∈
{0, 1}, i ∈ {1, ..., N b}). Define qbk(λ) := abxλ,b
k
(ωλk ); this is
the probability that ωλk passes the test Bob performs on the
k-th system in the reveal phase when Alice tries to reveal b.
Then q0k(λ) + q1k(λ) ≤ 2− δ, by our choice of δ.
Since Bob only accepts if he accepts the state ωλk of each
subsystem, we have:
p0 + p1 =
∑
λ
p(λ)
[
n∏
k=1
q0k(λ) +
n∏
k=1
q1k(λ)
]
. (7)
By convexity, we can fix some best choice for the randomness
λ and drop the label. An upper bound on
p0 + p1 =
n∏
k=1
q0k +
n∏
k=1
q1k, (8)
is obtained by maximizing it subject to 0 ≤ q0k, q1k ≤ 1 and
q0k + q
1
k ≤ 2 − δ. We should saturate the second inequality,
since adding to q0k or q1k can only increase the right-hand side
of Eq. (8). Now let Qb
kˆ
:=
∏
k=1..n
k 6=kˆ
qbk , so that p0 + p1 =
Q0
kˆ
q0
kˆ
+Q1
kˆ
q1
kˆ
. Since this expression is affine in q0
kˆ
, it’s clear
that if Q0
kˆ
> Q1
kˆ
, we should take q0
kˆ
= 1 and q1
kˆ
= 1 − δ,
and vice versa if Q1
kˆ
> Q0
kˆ
. If Q1
kˆ
= Q0
kˆ
, then we can take
either q0
kˆ
= 1 and q1
kˆ
= 1− δ or use the opposite assignment.
Therefore,
p0 + p1 ≤ max
m=0..⌊n/2⌋
(1 − δ)m + (1 − δ)n−m. (9)
If 0 < m < n/2, then we can increase the sum by moving
a 1 − δ term from (1 − δ)m to (1 − δ)n−m, from which it
follows that
p0 + p1 ≤
{
1 + (1− δ)n if n is odd;
max(1 + (1 − δ)n, 2(1− δ)n/2) if n is even.
For even n, note that 1+ (1− δ)n − 2(1− δ)n/2 = (1− (1−
δ)n/2)2 ≥ 0, so the maximum is always achieved by the first
term. This proves the theorem. 
VI. RELATED WORK
Winter, Nascimento, and Imai [20] found the optimal rate at
which a discrete memoryless classical channel from Alice to
Bob can be used to commit bits. Because the set of achievable
output distributions may be a nonsimplicial compact convex
body Ω, and the channel allows Alice to prepare any distri-
bution of products of states in this convex body, their setting
has similarities with ours. But it permits only a fixed output
measurement whereas ours permits any measurement of effects
in the cone dual to this convex body. Our setting also differs by
permitting unentangled nonclassical processing by Alice and
Bob. Also, the discreteness of the classical channel implies
that the set of possible output distributions for the channel
is a polytope, whereas in our theories Ω can be an arbitrary
compact convex body. Finally, we do not calculate rates, but
demonstrate exponentially secure commitment of a single bit;
bounding the rate in our theories would be interesting, but it
is not obvious what good analogues of the bounding entropic
expressions in [20] would be.
Wolf and Wullschleger (WW) [21] reach a conclusion
qualitatively similar to ours, that in a setting more general than
quantum theory, assumptions that rule out entanglement can
provide a secure protocol. They have told us that their result
will be strengthened in [22]. [21] assumes Alice and Bob have
access to many independent uses of the same trusted bipartite
box-pair, initially uncorrelated with anything else. The boxes
have binary inputs and outputs, but WW state that extension to
larger finite sets of inputs and outputs is straightforward. Under
the very weak condition that one party’s conditional state
depends on the other’s input, they provide a bit commitment
protocol and a security proof. Our setting is more general as
it does not assume a trusted joint Alice-Bob state.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In [13], [14], [23], it was shown that the no-broadcasting
and no-cloning theorems, and the tradeoff between information
gain and state disturbance, are generic in non-classical theories
in our framework. For the project of characterizing quantum
mechanics this focuses attention on properties, like the impos-
sibility of bit commitment and the possibility of teleportation,
that may not be generically non-classical.
Within our framework, if one makes the plausible as-
sumption that an information-disturbance tradeoff (which is
equivalent to nonclassicality) allows secure key distribution,
we may paraphrase the Brassard-Fuchs conjecture as saying
that the impossibility of bit commitment characterizes quan-
tum mechanics from among the nonclassical theories in our
framework. We have shown that nonclassical theories in which
bit commitment is impossible must have entanglement, but
in contrast to the situation for the C∗-algebraic framework,
in the general framework that is very far from narrowing us
down to quantum theory. An important open question, then, is
what, if any, sorts of theories in our framework that do have
entanglement, nevertheless permit bit commitment.
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